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Business Environment and Labor Market Outcomes in 
European and Central Asian Countries
Paloma Lopez-Garcia 
Banco de Espana'^ ^
Firm entry has been proven to be fundamental for job creation in transition economies. The 
creation of new ventures as well as their survival and expansion depends on the business 
environment of the country. It is therefore important to adopt policies aimed at improving the 
framework conditions in which firms are created and operate. The aim of this paper is to 
assess which of those conditions are most important for private sector employment creation in 
Eastern and Central Europe and Central Asia. For that purpose we run a multivariate 
regression where employment creation is explained by means of the interaction of a 
macroeconomic shock with the set of institutions shaping the business environment of the 
country. The rationale is that the investment climate determines the response of the labor 
market to the transition shock. We find that among European transition economies, the 
development of the financial sector is the most important variable. Market regulation (credit 
and labor regulation), start-up costs and the tax burden are all found to significantly affect 
employment as well. Among those economies further away from a market economy, 
especially those in Central Asia, market regulation, corruption and the (bad) quality of the 
legal system are found to be the most deterrent institutions for employment creation in the 
private sector. Next in line comes the access to the required financial means to create and 
expand a business.
1. Introduction
The Eastern and Central European countries and former soviet republics are all 
experiencing a unique process of transition towards a market economy which entails the 
emergence of a new private sector. Most large enterprises have closed or downsized during 
this transition period, reducing labor hoarding and shedding redundant labor so as to reach the
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economically efficient size. The result has been a reduction in the average firm size, which is 
becoming closer to that in market economies. But if the average firm size decreases, the only 
way to increase employment is through a faster pace of firm formation. Moreover, released 
workers must now find employment in the expanding new private sector, otherwise, 
unemployment will rise. The entry of new firms and survival and growth of the ah-eady 
existing ones is, therefore, crucial to absorb those displaced workers and should be a primary 
target of policy makers.
Firm entry and expansion depend on the quality of the business environment. 
Moreover, the set of rules and institutions which shape the investment climate of a country 
have been proven to amplify or dampen, depending on whether they are business friendly or 
not, the effect on the labor market of macroeconomic shocks such as the transition to a market 
economy.*
There are already some studies on the business environment of the European and 
Central Asian (ECA) countries, but they are all, to my knowledge, based on surveys and 
restricted to specific regions or countries. The most important survey is the Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) undertaken by the World Bank 
and the EBRD, which explores the opinion of a sizeable number of firms’ managers. Some 
examples of papers based on this survey are the summary of results written by Fries et al 
(2003), Broadman et al (2004) who use the BEEPS data and case studies to suggest 
institutional reforms for investment growth in SEE countries, and Bastos and Nasir (2003) 
who use the survey results to explore the impact of the investment climate on firm 
productivity. The Foreign Investment Advisory Service (FIAS) uses responses of private 
investors, government officials, policymakers and professionals to assess the administrative 
barriers to foreign investment in Croatia. The Global Entrepreneurship Monitor of Croatia
(2002), on the other hand, uses responses to a questionnaire of entrepreneurs and experts to 
evaluate the business environment of the country. Anecdotal evidence, case studies and the 
opinion of the IMF teams in the region are used by the papers of Vandycke (2003) and Shiells
(2003) to assess the investment climate in the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) 
coimtries.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, it constructs a set of indexes meant to capture 
the quality of the institutions affecting firm entry and expansion in all European and Central 
Asian countries for which hard data is available. Second, the paper identifies which of those 
institutions have the largest impact on private sector employment creation. For that purpose 
we perform a multivariate regression analysis using the business environment summary 
indexes as explanatory variables. Results will be dependent on how far the country is in its 
transition effort to a market economy. Third, in light of the empirical results the paper 
evaluates the weaknesses and strengths of the business environment in European and Central 
Asian transition economies. The aim of the exercise is to help policy-makers to focus on the 
most effective market reforms to enhance firm entry and growth and, therefore, emplo3mient 
creation.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section defines the business environment 
and constructs a set of summary indexes to capture its quality. Section 3 investigates the 
impact of the investment climate on labor market outcomes by means of multivariable
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 ^Lopez-Garcia (2002) estimates for the case of Italy that the effect on unemployment of the shock resulting in la 
large shift of workers from the agriculture to the service sector doubles when the bad quality of the institutions 
governing firm entry are taken into account.
quantitative analysis. The variable to be explained is the evolution over the 90s of the 
employment creation in the private sector. The explanatory variables are the interaction 
between the transition shock and the business environment indexes constructed in the 
previous section. The idea is that the response of the labor market to the transition shock 
depends on the set of institutions shaping the business environment. This exercise will show 
which institution or group of institutions is most important in average for employment 
growth.
Section 4 uses the estimation results to evaluate the business environment in European 
and Central Asian countries. We can calculate the contribution of each business environment 
institution to the service employment creation of the period for the set of variables for which 
there are complete data: The EU transition economies and two CIS countries, Ukraine and 
Russia. This analysis shows what institution or set of institutions have fostered or penalized 
emplo}mient creation those countries, depending on how far they are in their transition effort. 
We proceed then to evaluate the business environment of other transition economies using 
“softer” or subjective sources of information like investment guides or EBRD reports. We pay 
particular attention to the Central Asian former Soviet republics. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2. Measuring the Business Environment
What do we understand by business environment? The life cycle of a firm resembles 
that of a person. Firms are bom; if they survive birth they grow, or live at a comfortable small 
size; and eventually they die. This simplistic view of the entrepreneurial process can help 
classifying the regulations, institutions and policies that shape the business environment of 
one country or region into those that affect mostly the entry, and those that have an impact on 
the survival and growth of a firm.
Of course life is more complicated, and factors that have a direct impact on the day-to- 
day operations of a firm, like the tax burden, could have as well an impact on the entry 
decision. The reason is that expected profits net of taxes might simply not compensate the 
risks of a new venture and hence prevent entry. Other factors affect all stages of the firm 
cycle, therefore it is difficult to assess whether they belong to one or the other category. One 
example is corruption and red tape which make it costly and cumbersome to register a 
business and even more so to run it every day. Lastly, there are factors that do not fit in any of 
the categories suggested above. One of those factors is the bankruptcy law, which determines 
the direct cost of exit. Although it might be too simplistic, the classification of institutions 
into different groups, loosely related to the stages of the entrepreneurial process, helps 
analyzing systematically the context in which firms are created and operate.
What follows is a brief discussion of each of the institutions that shape the investment 
climate of a country. Although not exhaustive, the list of institutions provided is the outcome 
of the theoretical and empirical research carried out in the field of entrepreneurship. For a 
detailed description of the variables used to measure each of those institutions, as well as for 
an explanation about the construction of the summary indexes please refer to Appendix 2.
2.1. The entry decision of entrepreneurs
Which are the main barriers would-be entrepreneurs must overcome to create and 
sustain a new business?
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The two main barriers to firm creation are the administrative burdens on firm creation and the 
access to finance. Those two are the main obstacles identified by Europeans, according to a 
periodical empirical study on Entrepreneurship carried out by the European Commission.^
Administrative burdens on firm creation
Administrative burdens on firm creation might have a large impact on the labor market 
performance of transition economies. Burdens on firm creation have been proven to prevent 
job creation in the service sector, where firms are smaller and job creation depends heavily on 
new firm entry. Hence, in a situation of large job destruction in other economic sectors, high 
administrative costs on firm creation can result in high unemployment. That was the case in 
Spain and Italy, where many jobs were destroyed in the agriculture sector over the 70s and 
80s but the service sector did not generate enough jobs to absorb those displaced workers 
(Lopez-Garcia 2003).
During the last decade, transition economies have also experienced a large reallocation 
of workers due to the significant destruction of jobs in privatized companies and in the 
agriculture and over-staffed industrial sector. Hence we might expect high start-up costs to 
prevent firm entry and therefore increase unemployment.
Administrative burdens on firm creation refer to issues such as the number of 
procedures to register a business, the time and cost to undertake those procedures and the 
minimum capital requirements. However, as explained in Box 1, other “unofficial burdens” 
such as informal payments or bribes required to get business licenses, can have also a large 
impact on the administrative entry barriers for new businesses.
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Box 1
What the official data on entry barriers do not show: the case of Romania
Measurement matters. Different ways of measuring the same concept can yield different 
conclusions. The case of the start-up costs in Romania is a good example of that.
According to objective data fi'om the World Bank, opening a business is easy in Romania: no 
more than 6 procedures are required to start a business, one can go through the process in less 
than a month (37 days in average in Europe) and the cost of the process and minimum capital 
requirements are among the lowest in the EC A countries.
However, when one looks at similar indicators of start-up costs based on subjective opinions, 
in this case of managers of large corporations, the situation is quite different. According to the 
evaluation given to the sentence “Starting a new business is generally easy” by the Global 
Competitiveness Report, Romania is one of the countries where starting a business is most 
difficult (figure 2.1).
The difference between the objective and subjective indicators could reflect the existence of 
corruption in Romania, which is not included in any of the objective measures of start-up
 ^ Flash Eurobarometer 134 “Entrepreneurship”. Done by EOS Gallup Europe upon request of the European 
Commission (DG XXIII), 2000, 2001 and 2002. In general, around 70% of the people surveyed agree that the 
existing administrative procedures are complex and 76% claim that the main problem is lack of available 
finance.
costs compiled by the World Bank. Indeed, when one looks at the OCR’s evaluation of the 
sentence “irregular additional payments connected with import and export permits, business 
licenses, exchange controls, tax assessments, police protection or loan applications are very 
rare” (figure 2.2), Romania along with Turkey occupies the last position.
Hence objective indicators have to be complemented sometimes with subjective impressions 
and anecdotal evidence to get a complete picture of the business environment in each country.
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Access to finance
Another large concern of would-be entrepreneurs is access to finance. External 
finance, that is, resources other than the entrepreneur’s own savings, is often necessary to start 
a business --one needs to rent office space, buy computers, or maybe test a prototype--. 
External finance is also important to expand an existing business.
However, entrepreneurs have generally difficulty securing bank loans. The reason is 
that banks want a positive track record and collateral -something which new firms generally 
do not have. Although another possible source of finance is risk capital, venture capital funds 
are invested mainly in the expansion phase of high growth businesses, ignoring the initial 
stages of firms all together. Besides, the development of venture capital goes hand in hand 
with that of the stock markets, which are still underdeveloped in transition economies.
A study of the entrepreneurial activity in Croatia^ found out that business opportunities 
were exploited mostly by high-income individuals. This finding suggests that potential 
entrepreneurs are credit constrained. The reasons are the high cost of credit, large collateral 
required by banks, or lack of credit available to the private sector. Data on those indicators 
have been used to construct an index of access to finance in each of the countries under 
analysis. For more details, please refer to Appendix 2.
The lack of development of the financial sector in many of the ECA countries is the 
consequence, among other things, of: 1) lack of proper regulation of the banking sector; 2) 
lack of competition in some countries because the State still holds majority ownership in large 
banks; 3) low deposit rate due to the mistrust of the banking sector and 4) the risk-aversion of 
banks before new or small businesses.
Exit costs
Bankruptcy costs, and the more elusive stigma of failure, might have a large effect on 
the entry decision of would-be entrepreneurs. That is the reason why we have included the 
exit costs in the section dedicated to factors preventing firm entry.
The importance of bankruptcy costs to explain entrepreneurial activity is based on the 
observed large differences in the perception and the cost of failure between Europe and the 
US. While around 50% of the Europeans surveyed in an empirical study affirmed that “one 
should not start a business if there is a risk it might fail”, only 25% of North-Americans 
thought the same.^ Among the risks most feared are the risk of losing one’s property and the
 ^ Slavica Singer et al. (2003): What makes Croatia a (non) entrepreneurial country? Global Entrepreneurship 
Monitor 2002.
Flash Eurobarometer 134 “Entrepreneurship”. Done by EOS Gallup Europe upon request of the European 
Commission (DG XXIII), 2000,2001 and 2002.
risk of going bankrupt; hence the bankruptcy law might play an important role in preventing 
firm creation.
Although the cost of failure is difficult to measure, the World Bank has gathered 
information on the time and cost of going through an insolvency process in each of the 
countries under analysis. For more details, please refer to Appendix 2.
2.2. The survival and growth of new firms
Entrepreneurs face many obstacles. Complying with administrative regulations and 
their related costs is one of the most significant burdens. But also the red tape, the degree of 
flexibility of the labour market or the tax burden constraint business performance.
Institutions affecting the day-to-day operation of businesses are important for two 
reasons: first, they affect the expected benefits and costs from creating a firm, which are taken 
into account by would-be entrepreneurs. Moreover, even if they do not prevent 
entrepreneurship, they might force entrepreneurs into the informal economy, where their 
prospects of prospering and growing are low. Second, once the entry decision has been taken, 
they have an impact on survival and expansion -and therefore on job creation— of existing 
businesses.
Government interference
Some governments may impose price controls and cumbersome regulations, carry out 
over-inquisitive tax inspections and hold or control fundamental sectors of the economy. 
Another important set of factors may consist in the actions governments are not taking. Some 
examples are poor enforcement of the law, poor protection of property rights and laissez-faire 
with respect to bribes and corruption.
For operational purposes, data on government interference has been organized around 
four big issues: the quality of the legal system, market regulation (which includes credit 
and labor market regulations), size of government and corruption. Please refer to Appendix 
2 for detailed definitions of each of those components.
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Box 2
Efficient but not independent judicial systems; the cases of Russia and Turkey
The quality of the legal system comprises aspects of the efficiency of courts. But it also should 
take into account the independence of the judicial system fi*om political and economic agents 
and the protection to property rights.
The World Bank offers information on issues related to the efficiency of courts to enforce 
contracts. They are derived from questionnaires answered by attorneys at private law firms. 
According to that information, courts in Russia and Turkey are more efficient than the 
European average when dealing with disputes about contract enforcement (figure 2.3).
However, when one looks at the independence from the government, impartiality and 
integrity of the judicial system -a ll provided by the 2003 Annual Report of Economic 
Freedom of the World, a compilation of objective and survey data-, those two countries, 
precisely, score last in the ECA countries ranking (figure 2.4).
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Hence, it is not enough to look at the efficiency of the courts to assess the quahty of the legal 
system. One has also to explore the independence of the courts and the protection to property 
rights to get a complete picture.
Tax system
Apart from the level of taxes, potential entrepreneurs may be deterred by the 
frequency of changes in the fiscal law, which enhances business’ uncertainty. Together with 
the frequent and over-inquisitive tax inspections, this practice results in entrepreneurs 
spending the bulk of their resources, be them money or time, trying to comply with the tax 
law rather than to business planning.
Hence both the tax burden and the tax law (transparency and predictability) are 
important factors affecting the survival and growth of business.
3. The Impact of the Business Environment on Labor Market Performance
A rigorous analysis of how the investment climate affects labor market outcomes 
requires multivariate regression modelling. Multivariate regressions have an advantage over 
bilateral correlations, namely, one can control for a range of variables. Hence the average 
impact of better access to finance on employment performance, for example, can be 
estimated, given the value o f the rest o f the dimensions o f the investment climate. One can also 
control for country effects, that is, for specific characteristics of each country that are constant 
over time and are not explicitly taken into account. For a detailed description of the regression 
model used please refer to Appendix 3.
3.1. How do economists explain labor market performance?
While there is wide consensus on the determinants of cyclical unemployment --namely 
aggregate demand and aggregate supply fluctuations caused by the demand and supply shocks 
hitting the economy-, the determinants of the natural rate of unemployment have been at the 
core of the research agenda of labor economists over the last three decades.
In the 1970s the discussion about the determinants of unemployment was dominated 
by a “shock story.” Supply shocks of the 1970s and 1980s and restrictive macroeconomic 
policies to fight inflation were blamed for unemployment. But shocks across countries are not 
likely to vary enough to explain, first, the persistence of high unemployment and, second, the 
observed differences in labor market performance. The focus then moved to institutions, 
ignoring shocks altogether. But those institutions in many countries have not varied enough 
along time to explain properly the unemployment evolution over the last decades.
In consequence, labor economists are turning lately to explanations of unemployment 
that use the interaction between shocks and institutions: shocks can explain the evolution 
along time of unemployment, and institutions the differences across countries. The argument 
is that the institutional setting o f a country shapes the impact that otherwise similar shocks 
have upon the labor market performance. ^
 ^ The first economists to propose this idea were Michael Bruno and Jeffrey Sachs (M. Bruno and J. Sachs 
(1985): Economics o f Worldwide Stagflation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press). In their 1985 book, The 
Economics of Worldwide Stagflation, they focused on the interaction o f the 1970s oil price shocks with the 
nature of collective bargaining. But it was only after the publication in 2000 o f Blanchard and Wolfers’ model of 
equihbrium unemployment that the interaction o f shocks with institutions became a popular explanation among 
labor economists for the unemployment evolution of developed countries. See O. Blanchard and J. Wolfers
Transition economies have been hit by a similar shock over the last decade, namely, a 
transition shock. But their labor markets have reacted differently. Some countries have 
managed to go through with low unemployment while others have ended up with a poor 
employment score. Why is that? The answer is that the impact of the shock depends on 
whether the institutions of the country are more or less friendly to employment creation.
3.2. The dependent variable
Labor outcomes in this paper will be approximated by the evolution of the service 
employment rate.^ The rationale for this is that service employment rate is a good proxy for 
employment created by the new private sector since it is the only sector increasing its share of 
employment in all transition countries. It is also where new business opportunities can be 
mostly found. To separate the effect of economic development from the direct effect of the 
business environment institutions on the growth of the service sector, we use a corrected 
measure of service employment rate which controls for the GDP per capita.
Total employment, the sum of private and public employment, has been proven to be 
less sensitive to the investment climate of a country then service employment. The reason is 
that public employment responds to factors other than the business environment. Despite the 
fact that the same applies to the unemployment rate, we will also use the latter as dependent 
or explained variable to test the robustness of our results.
3.3. The explanatory variables
We will explain the evolution of service employment with the interaction of a 
transition shock with a set of investment climate institutions.
Which institutions are we considering?
The rate of creation of new firms, and therefore job creation, depends on those 
institutions that shape the business environment where firms operate, described in section 2 of 
this paper. We intend to explore the impact of each of those institutions on the labor market. 
The list of institutions considered in the regression model is as follows:
• Administrative burdens on firm creation (start-up costs)
• Cost of going bankrupt (exit costs)
• Access to finance (cost and availability of finance)
(2000). The Role o f Shocks and Institutions in the Rise o f European Unemployment: The Aggregate Evidence, 
The Economic Journal 110: C1-C33.
 ^ The service employment level comes from the ILO database. It is the sum o f the employment in the following 
sectors: wholesale and retail trade; repair o f motor vehicles, motorcycles and personal household goods; hotels 
and restaurants; transport, storage and communications; financial intermediation; real state, renting and business 
activities. Hence we do not include employment in public administration and defence, employment in education, 
health and social work and other community, social and personal services. The reason is that employment in the 
latter sectors does not come generally from private initiative, which is the focus o f the chapter. In most cases 
data are from Labour Force Surveys, which ensures comparability. However, for the following set o f countries 
the data source is official estimates: Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan. The service employment 
rate is calculated as percentage o f working age population (15-64).
 ^To control for the economic development we run a regression of the service employment rate against the GDP 
per capita. The residuals from that regression represent the service employment rate NOT explained by the 
development o f the economy. The residual is what we call the “service employment rate controlled for GDP per 
capita.”
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• Quality of the legal system (efficiency and independence of courts)
• Market regulations (credit and labor market regulation)
• Corruption (Perceived corruption level, from Transparency International)
• Tax burden (tax revenue as percentage of GDP)
For a detailed account on the construction of indexes able to capture the quality of those 
institutions, please refer to Appendix 2.
What shocks are we considering?
The EC A countries have been hit by a major shock over the last decades: the fall of the 
communism regime and transition to a market economy. We will use the EBRD transition 
index to size the shock across countries and to follow its evolution along time.
The EBRD transition index aims to reflect each country’s moment in the transition 
towards a market economy. Hence it deals, among other things, with issues such as the 
emergence of a private sector, the size of the government and so on, that is, with some of the 
indicators of the business environment we have considered in section 2. Therefore we could 
have some multicollinearity problems in the regressions, that is, relationship between 
explanatory variables which could distort the estimation results.^
Partly due to this problem, partly to be able to isolate the impact of institutions from 
that of the transition shock on the service employment rate, we proceed in two stages: first, 
we estimate the model assuming that all countries have been hit by a shock o f the same 
magnitude. Hence differences across countries are solely due to differences in institutions. 
Second, we will allow the shock to be of different magnitude in each country in order to 
estimate the impact of the interaction between the transition shock and the business 
environment on the development of the service sector. However, we must take the estimation 
results fi-om this last exercise with caution due to the multicollinearity problem mentioned 
above.
3.4. Estimation results of multivariate analysis 
Common shock
To isolate the impact of the institutions on the service employment and unemployment 
rate from the effect of the transition shock, we begin assuming that the shock has been the 
same across countries. Hence, if labor market outcomes are different that is solely due to 
differences in investment climate. The results of the estimation of the regression are shown in 
Table 1.
Imagine we had a representative country where the investment climate was exactly the 
average across ECA countries. Then the shock (our proxy for the transition shock) would 
explain an increase in service employment rate (different from the natural increase in service 
employment due to economic development) of 0.8 percentage points. The unemployment rate 
in such a representative country would increase almost 1 percentage point.
But service employment and unemployment have not changed equally across countries 
after the shock. Since we are assuming, for the moment, that the shock is the same for all 
countries, dijferent labor market outcomes must be due to differences in the investment 
climate. Business environment institutions that impede the economy to readjust after being hit
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’ However, even so, the regression estimates will still be unbiased and consistent.
by a shock might increase the negative impact of that shock. That is what the coefficients of
the rest of the variables are telUng us.
The two most important variables explaining service employment are the access to 
finance and credit and labor market regulation. The importance of those two variables is 
confirmed by the results of the unemployment regression, although one must keep in mind 
that institutions that shape the business environment have a smaller impact on total 
employment or unemployment than on the service (or private) sector.
The next variable in importance is the administrative burdens on firm creation. 
Administrative burdens on firm creation decrease the service employment rate. As expected, 
administrative burdens on firm creation have less of an important effect on total employment 
and imemployment. The reason is that they do not affect public sector employment.
As the public sector decreases in size, labor market outcomes will be determined by 
the strength of the private sector. The estimation results indicate that lower administrative 
costs to register a business can help creating a healthy and employment-prone private sector.
Across countries with a similar degree of economic development, those with a lower 
tax burden enjoy higher service employment rates and lower unemployment. It is important to 
control for the degree of economic development, otherwise, and given that more developed 
economies have in place better mechanisms to collect taxes and a smaller informal sector, the 
impact of the tax burden could not be properly estimated.
The existence o f an efficient and independent legal system and the perceived 
corruption level matter for employment outcomes, but their impact cannot be separated from 
the impact o f economic development. The quality of the legal system increases, and corruption 
decreases, as the country develops. Hence their effect on the service employment rate is 
accounted for already by the economic development variable. The importance of the 
corruption level in explaining unemployment, in table 1 above, seems to confirm that 
hypothesis, since in that regression the economic development of the country has not been 
explicitly controlled for. To further confirm it, we have also run the service employment 
regression without controlling for GDP per capita and got a significant negative impact of 
corruption levels on service employment rate.
Actual EBRD transition shock
After estimating the model assuming a common shock across countries, which was 
considered a proxy for the transition shock, we re-estimate everything using instead the 
EBRD transition shock. Thus, the state of the transition process is now taken into account.
Given the econometric problems identified earlier in the section, the purpose of this 
exercise is solely to check whether the investment climate institutions have had a larger 
impact on labor market performance due to the fact that the set of countries under analysis are 
undertaking a large reallocation process (of workers, skills and jobs).
The table shows the contribution of the institutions to the increase in unemployment 
over the period 1992-2002 in Hungary, according to the common shock and transition shock 
regressions.
The unemployment rate in Hungary has decreased 3.5 percentage points over the 
period of analysis. Of the two models considered, the one where the transition shock is 
identified performs better.
The transition process Hungary has undertaken so far would have increased 
unemployment in a country with average institutions 3.8 percentage points. But the
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particularly friendly institutional setting of the country explains that, instead, the predicted 
change in unemployment is of -2.1 percentage points. Why is that? The main reason is 
Hungary’s developed financial market, with easy access to finance. It is also due to the lower 
than average government intervention in the economy.
What is really interesting from Table 2 is that the importance o f ALL institutions 
conforming Hungary’s investment climate increase if the transition shock is taken into 
account. In other words, a fnendly business environment is especially important in those 
countries where the private sector needs to create enough employment to compensate job 
destruction elsewhere in the economy, as it is the case in all transition economies.
4. Evaluating the Business Environment in European and Central Asian Countries
4.1. EU transition economies
The particular contribution of each of the investment climate institutions to the labor 
outcome in the first wave of EU transition economies (with the exception of Estonia due to a 
lack of data) can be calculated fi*om the estimation results shown in the previous section. The 
purpose of the exercise is to review what variable or set of variables is hindering the most 
emplo3m[ient creation in the private sector of the new EU economies.
The way of reading the table above is the following. The first row reflects the actual 
change in service employment (corrected by GDP per capita, or not explained by economic 
development). All countries have experienced an increase in service employment, above the 
one implied by economic development, but Lithuania where the service employment is lower 
than the one we should expect given its GDP per capita.
The second row shows the change in service employment predicted by the model, 
given the impact of the time shock, country-specific effect, and investment climate in the 
country. In average (last column) the model performs quite well, which means that the set of 
institutions conforming the business environment is quite good in explaining the employment 
performance in the private sector.
Recall that if all countries had the same investment climate, set at the cross-country 
average, the impact of the shock on the labor market would be the same because the shock is 
assumed to be equal across countries (in table 3 that is not the case because the period of 
analysis is not the same for all countries). If the actual impact of the shock on labor market 
performance in different EGA countries is different is because institutions vary across 
countries.
Start-up costs are higher than the cross-country average in all countries in table 3 but 
in Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia, which explains its average negative contribution to the 
development of the service sector. Hungary, where the cost of starting a company is well 
above the EGA average, is the only country strongly penalized by the high start-up costs. 
However, given that the estimated coefficient of start-up costs, although significant, is quite 
small the average contribution of that institution is quite low.
The main contributor to employment creation in the private sector is the access to 
finance. A better access to finance than the average in EGA countries can explain the good 
private employment performance of Himgary and Poland. Slovenia, another country where 
the access to finance is quite easy for entrepreneurs, would have performed much better if it 
was not because of the very strict labor market regulation (one of the most rigid across all 
EGA countries) and high tax burden. Note that, in average, access to finance can explain
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about 40% of the whole increase in service employment predicted by the model. Hence, this 
highlights the importance of this variable.
Market regulation includes both credit and labor regulation. It is a very important 
variable to explain the good performance of Hungary, in spite of the high start-up costs, and 
the bad performance of Slovenia which, as mentioned before, has one of the strictest labor 
codes in the region.
In summary, the institutions that have contributed the most to the development of the 
service sector, in average, are in this order: the easy access to finance for entrepreneurs, the 
low tax burden, low start-up costs and market de-regulation. Table 4 shows the same type of 
exercise for the next wave of transition economies (Bulgaria, Romania and Croatia).
The model is less powerful predicting the actual service employment change in the 
next wave of transition countries. That may be due to the fact that corruption and the quality 
of the legal system play far more an important role in this group of countries than they did for 
the first wave of countries to become EU members. One possible indication of that is that the 
model fits best the case of Croatia, the country with the best legal system and lowest 
corruption level of the three. However, in average (considering all countries in the sample) 
corruption and the quality of the legal system were not significant, hence they are not 
included in the table.
Romania is the only country of the three with a service employment change smaller 
than the one we should expect given its GDP per capita. The model points quite clearly to the 
very poor access to finance in the country as the institution to be blamed. Indeed, Romania 
scores last in the access to finance ranking due to its very high real interest rates, high 
collateral and, above all, lack of protection to creditors (according to the World Bank, 
Romania is the only country with the lowest possible score in that respect).
Bulgaria has already undertaken reforms to lower start-up costs, reduce corruption and 
lower the real interest rates as well as increase creditors’ protection, all of which explains the 
better than average performance of that country.
In summary, the institutions that have had a larger impact on the service sector within 
this group of countries, in average, are in this order: the access to finance, start-up costs, 
market regulation and tax burden. Note that the tax burden was the second institution in 
importance within the new EU members while here it is the last variable in importance. 
Instead, market regulation seems to be a larger problem for the second wave of EU transition 
economies countries.
4.2. Other transition economies 
Russia and Ukraine
Russia and Ukraine are the two only CIS countries for which complete data is 
available. We proceed to estimate, as it was done before, the contribution of each of the 
investment climate institutions to their labor market outcomes. The main purpose is to check 
whether those institutions have played in these less market-oriented set of countries a similar 
role as they played in the First wave of EU transition economies.
Although we do not have data on the actual service employment change in Russia and 
Ukraine, the one predicted by the model is larger in Ukraine than in Russia. Those two 
countries are particularly comparable because the time shock refers to the same period. So the 
differences in predicted employment are only due to different institutions. Although start-up 
costs are lower in Russia than in Ukraine, the access to finance and, above all, the market
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regulation (recall, credit and labor market regulation) are worse. Market regulation is actually 
the key to explain the relatively worse performance of Russia.
The main problems of Russia and Ukraine, in average, are the market regulation, 
access to finance and start-up costs, in this order. The less developed tax-collecting system 
implies that the tax burden is theoretically lower in that country, which has benefited 
(according to the model) employment.
It is interesting to note that the importance of some of the business environment 
institutions varies depending on the degree of development of the economy. Market 
regulation, for example, becomes more important for (the lack of) employment creation as 
countries are further away from a market economy. That makes sense since new EU 
countries, maybe with the exception of Slovenia, have all done their homework with respect 
to market reforms. Corruption and the quality of the legal system become as well an issue 
only in less developed economies. Indeed, many of the CIS countries have introduced new 
commercial laws complying with western standards. However, the implementation of those 
laws is encountering difficulties given the widespread corruption, lack of know-how and 
independence of the judiciary system.
The other noticeable difference between the First wave of EU transition economies 
and Russia and Ukraine is the role of the tax burden, which only is a problem in those 
countries with a proper tax administration and tax-collecting infrastructure in place. It is, 
obviously, a secondary problem in countries where the informal sector is large or tax fraud 
extended.
Although the access to finance is, with little changes, the most important institution to 
explain employment outcomes, it comes in second place in the set of less reformed 
economies. Market regulation and corruption are the big issues in those countries. But once a 
certain degree of market reform has been achieved, as it is the case of the EU transition 
countries, access to finance becomes the key variable to explain employment differences. 
Indeed, the development of the financial sector and easy access to finance can explain about 
40% of the private employment creation, according to the model, in the first wave of EU 
transition economies. On the other hand, the poor access to finance in Bulgaria, Croatia and, 
above all, Romania is the main factor behind their poor development of the private sector.
Central Asian republics
The previous section has analyzed with certain detail what should be done to improve 
the investment climate in the group of most advanced transition economies. However, we 
have seen that what needs to be done varies depending on how far a country is from a market 
economy. For that reason, it is important to evaluate as well the business environment of the 
least reformed group of countries according to the EBRD transition index shown in figure 4.1, 
the Central Asian transition economies: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz republic, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan 
and Turkmenistan.^
Unfortunately, due to the lack of appropriate data we cannot perform for that group of 
countries a quantitative analysis as the one above in all countries. What we can do, however, 
is a benchmarking exercise to identify the main weaknesses and strengths of their business
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 ^There are, however, large differences among the countries o f this region. Probably the most advanced nations, 
in terms of implementing the principles o f a free-market economy, are Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic. In 
the other side of the spectrum one can find Uzbekistan and Turkraenistan, where private business is virtually 
non-existent.
environment. We will always present the average value of the index for the countries with 
data within a certain region: Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), Southern and Central Europe 
(SEE), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) and those CIS countries belonging to 
the Central Asian region (CA).^^ When no other source is available, like in the case of 
Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, we will resort to “softer” sources of information such as 
investment guides, BERD reports and the like.
The set of institutions analyzed will be those found to be important in the empirical 
analysis of the previous section. The order of analysis corresponds to the order of importance 
of those institutions in Russia and Ukraine, the two CIS countries with complete hard data 
and, therefore, analyzed in depth.
Market regulation
According to the empirical analysis, the first variable in importance with regard to 
employment performance in the least advanced group of countries is labor and credit market 
regulation. Although in all EC A countries markets are more regulated than in the US new EU 
members tend to have less regulated markets than CIS and Turkey (Figure 4.2). The exception 
is maybe Slovenia, the EU transition economy that fares worst in the index.
On the other extreme of the spectrum, market regulation in CIS countries is regarded 
as inconsistent, not transparent, hard to keep track of (in some countries new regulations are 
not published) and cumbersome, which can help explaining the large size of the informal 
economy in some of them (Figure 4.4).^  ^ According to reports from the EBRD, Uzbekistan 
and Turkmenistan have made limited progress in privatization and structural and institutional 
reforms since it seems that the goveniment is generally unwilling to sell controlling interest in 
enterprises. On the other hand, among the Central Asian republics, Kazakhstan has made 
important progress and is the lead reformer within the CIS group, although still well behind 
the average standards set by the new EU transition economies.
Corruption
Corruption is closely related to excessive regulations, and it has been shown to be a 
severe obstacle to business formation and growth, as well as to job creation in some countries. 
Given that corruption looms large in ECA economies, its negative impact on employment is 
likely to be substantial. Even the countries belonging to the first wave of new EU countries, 
where corruption is least widespread among ECA countries, are perceived as much more 
corrupt than EU15. Corruption is a severe issue in non EU transition economies (including 
EU accession countries) as it is in Turkey, and is perceived as widespread in CIS, especially 
in Central Asian republics (Figure 4.3).
Indeed, despite severe penalties and the prosecution of corruptors, bribery is 
widespread in Central Asia, being the most common form of corruption, especially in areas of 
government procurement, transfers and approvals and business-related services. This explains 
the large size of the informal sector (Figure 4.4) in this group of countries. Businesses 
operating in the grey economy have no access to credit or to public subsidies and are, in 
average, smaller. Hence, they have much lower probabilities of growing. It is therefore
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As far as possible we also include in the rankings the European average (for country grouping please refer to 
Appendix 1) and the United States.
According to the World Bank, the informal economy in Georgia and Azerbaijan is about 60% o f GNI (data for 
2003). In Central Asian countries the percentage is about 40%.
imperative to easy regulations and inspections so firms find it worthwhile to emerge to the 
legal economy.
The legal system
We have seen that firm expansion and job creation are supported by an efficient legal 
system. The legal structure and security of property rights in EC A lag behind those in the US 
or EU15. The legal system is most developed in EU transition economies, less so in other 
European transition economies, and least developed in CIS and Turkey (Figure 4.5). 
Strengthening the legal system, that is, ensuring greater security of property rights, improving 
contract enforcement and improving the efficiency of dispute resolution will advance the 
investment climate in the group of least market-oriented countries and thus be conducive to 
employment generation.
Although there is no proper data for Central Asian countries, the EBRD claims that the 
main problem in the region is that courts and institutions which implement and administer the 
new commercial laws are not independent of the government, remain subject to political 
influence and are corrupt. Moreover, transparency in the application of laws is a major 
problem and the complex and sometimes contradictory norms hinder the functioning of the 
legal system. Contract enforcement is also relatively poor. Investment guides highlight that 
Kazakhstan’s commercial laws are in pair with those in other CIS countries, although not so 
much their implementation. On the other hand, according to the EBRD, in Tajikistan the 
problem of corruption in the judiciary and the lack of implementation of the new laws are 
among the most serious constraints on the country’s transition to a functioning market 
economy.
Access to finance
Maybe this is one of the areas where differences among the regions are largest (Figure 
4.5b). Generally, access to finance is better in EU transition economies than in SEE, CIS and 
Central Asia. The relative good position of Azerbaijan is explained by a maximum creditors’ 
right index, according to the World Bank. However, contrary to what the index may convey, 
the banking and capital markets of Azerbaijan are very underdeveloped as shown by its very 
low credit to the private sector. This is something conmion to all CIS countries with the 
exception of Kazakhstan, a Central Asian country who is moving rapidly towards adoption of 
intemational banking standards. However, even in that country there is still strong 
concentration (3 largest banks control 60% of total banking assets) and low level of deposits.
In the Kyrgyz Republic, the banking system is at an early stage of development. The 
government is undertaking a consolidation process of the sector by introducing prudential 
standards and high minimum capital requirements. The intermediation role of the banks, 
however, remains very small. Most banks issue short-term credit at very high interest rates 
and only after important securities is given. According to IMF data, the real interest rate is 
around 20%.
As far as we can infer from investment guides, the situation is very constraining in 
Uzbekistan, where the banking system is still closely controlled by the state through a 
complex set of regulations, and even more in Turkmenistan where state-owned banks account 
for more than 90% of total assets and the ratio of domestic credit to the private sector is 
limited to 1.4% of GDP (15% in average in CIS countries).
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There are some programs in many of these countries baked by international donors to 
extend credit to micro-enterprises. But overall, lack of long to medium-term credit at 
affordable prices is a key constraint to the development of the private sector in this group of 
countries.
Start-up costs
While the birth of new firms is critical for job creation, in many ECA countries 
starting a business is not easy (figure 4.6). After all, in most ECA countries the start-up cost 
index is less favorable than in the US (where it is least costly to start a business) or in Europe. 
The EU transition economies fare best on this scale. It is also relatively easy to start a new 
business in the three Central Asian former soviet republics for which there is data: 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic and Uzbekistan. According to World Bank data, to register a 
business in Kazakhstan one requires undertaking 10 procedures (7 in Europe and 9 in the CEE 
average) which take around 25 days, only longer than the US and Latvia. In Kyrgyzstan, the 
government has set an agency based in the “one-stop shop” model. The cost of the overall 
process and the minimum capital requirement in the Kyrgyz Republic, however, is still quite 
high. In those Central Asian republics there are complains, however, about the transparency 
of the system, since some regulations are never published or are inconsistent with previous or 
local regulations.
Cumbersome procedures, unofficial payments required and disinformation about the 
registration process seems to be the situation in the two Central Asian republics for which 
there is no World Bank data, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan. The business environment survey 
conducted by the IFC (2003) states, for example, that 65% of SMEs in Tajikistan face 
difficulties obtaining comprehensive and reliable information about the registration process 
and 98% make unofficial payments to complete the regulatory procedures.
The tax burden
The tax burden has been shown to hamper employment creation mainly in the EU transition 
economies, where there are in place efficient tax-collecting systems and the informal sector is 
relatively small. Both the tax burden (figure 4.7) and tax regulation are regularly perceived by 
firm managers in ECA countries as one of the main obstacles for business (ICA Survey, 
World Bank).
But not only the tax burden matters. The transparency and inspection system in place 
are equally important. In the Kyrgyz republic, for example, there are about 19 different taxes 
that involve complex and time-consuming accounting. Transparency is a problem since tax 
rates and regulations are seldom published. That along with draconian and over-inquisitive tax 
inspections could explain that many businesses find it worth-while to go underground.
5. Conclusion
The importance of new firm creation for job creation in the transition economies has 
introduced the urge to improve the framework in which firms operate. This paper aims to help 
policy-makers to assess which of the institutions shaping the business environment are most 
important to help job creation and, therefore, reduce unemployment.
To achieve that aim we have first defined and quantified what we understand by 
business environment. For operational reasons we have grouped the institutions affecting 
entrepreneurship into two groups: those institutions affecting firm entry and those affecting
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business survival and growth. Indexes combining diverse information for each of those 
institutions were constructed. Accordingly, firm entry conditions depend on the start-up and 
exit costs as well as on the access to finance. Firm survival and growth depend on the size of 
the government, ability of the legal system to enforce contracts and protect property, market 
regulations and corruption. The tax burden was also considered to have an impact on the day- 
to-day operations of business.
After defining what we understand for business environment, the next step was to 
analyze the relationship between its different dimensions and the labor market performance. 
To control for other variables and estimate the impact of each of the institutions on 
employment creation, we run a multivariate regression using the interaction of the institutions 
with the transition shock as explanatory variables. We aimed to find whether countries with a 
fnendlier business environment were able to go through the transition process with a better 
labor market performance.
The results of the multivariate analysis point at the access to finance, market 
regulation and start-up costs as the main contributors to employment creation in the private 
sector and, hence, to a lower unemployment rate. However, one of the most interesting and 
important results of the paper is that the relative importance of the different business 
environment institutions varies depending on how far the country is from a market economy. 
That is, the results of the paper clearly reject a “one policy for all” approach. Within the new 
EU countries, those most advanced in the transition process, easy access to finance for 
entrepreneurs and a low tax burden are the two variables that, in average, contribute the most 
to employment creation in the private sector. Then one has to consider in order of importance 
the administrative burdens on firm creation and credit and labor market regulation.
The model corresponds less to the data of Russia and Ukraine, the only two CIS 
countries we could analyze in detail. The reason is the importance of corruption and bad 
quality of the legal system in those less developed countries. We find that the further away the 
countries are from a market economy, the more important the quality of the legal system, lack 
of corruption and market de-regulation become. Hence, the priority in the countries belonging 
to the Commonwealth of Independent States, especially the Central Asian republics, the least 
developed of them all, is to strengthen the court system, guarantee the independence of the 
judges and reduce corruption. Market reforms come next. It is also important that regulations 
are transparent and stable along time, making it easy for businesses to comply. Lastly, access 
to finance of private firms has to improve reducing the presence and influence of the State in 
the banking sector, increasing deposits and normalizing the flow of credit to the private 
sector.
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Figure 2.1
Subjective perception o f how easy (or difficult) is to start a business
GCR: In your country starting a business is easy
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Figure 2.2
Bribes are rarely needed to obtain business licenses
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Figure 2.3
Ranking o f countries according to the efficiency o f courts to enforce contracts
Contract enforcement index
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Figure 2.4
However efficient, courts do not have to be necessarily independent
Legal structure and security of property rights
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Figure 4.1
EBRD transition Index: Commonwealth of Independent States
EBRD Transition Index: CIS
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Figure 4.2
Markets in EC A tend to be overregulated which is likely to hamper job creation
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Figure 4.3
Corruption is high in ECA raising the costs o f doing business and inhibiting job creation
Corruption index
Source: Transparency International (2002)
Figure 4.4
Informal Economy as % GNI (WB; Doing business 2003)
Informal economy as % of GNI
LO
Source: Doing Business 2003, The World Bank
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Figure 4.5
ECA countries lag behind as regards the efficiency of independence of the 
judicial system and protection o f property rights
10
Legal structure and security of property rights
Source: Economic Freedom of the World (2003)
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Figure 4.5 b
Good access to finance is one of the main contributors to a good employment performance
10
9
Access to finance index
Source: World Bank, World Development Indicators (2002); IMF WP/99/54; and own 
calculations.
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Figure 4.6
While firm formation is key for job creation, starting a business 
is not easy in many EC A countries
start-up cost index
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
2
1
0 L_.
<nC:! c T3C
_QO
a.
Q . Q . CJ CU 
OC QC
U
s s
it; ^
c
o
T 3<U
rs fo >fg O O 2 O O
u
ro ra <T3
_G03
CQ
2  S'
1/5 o c
05 TO fO
<
£occ
Source: World Bank, Cost of Doing Business Database (2003); and own calculations
60 Business Environment and Labor Market Outcomes... (Lopez-Garci'a)
Figure 4.7
The tax burden becomes a problem to firm survival and growth as 
countries advance in their transition to a market economy
Tax revenue, % GDP
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Table 1
Estimation results
Type of regression: Common shocks across countries assumed
Dependent variable
Service employment 
(corrected) Unemployment
Coefficients t-statistics Coefficients t-statistics
Shocks (given 
average institutions) 0.8% 0.85%
Start-up cost index -0.29* (-1.45) 0.09 (0.26)
Exit cost index -0.003 (-0.28) -0.006 (-0.24)
Finance index 0.41** (2.95) -0.18 (-0.42)
Legal system index -0.04 (-1.13) -0.05 (-0.86)
Mk. Regulation 
index
-0.64** (-2.45) 1.73* (1.53)
Corruption index 0.06 (0.33) 1.57** (2.37)
Tax burden -0.08 (-1.11) 0.43** (2.35)
Observations 106 104
Adjusted R-Squared 0.95 0.77
Non-linear least square estimation 
*significant at \5%
**significant at 1%
Table 2
Contribution o f institutions to unemployment increase 
according to a model with common shocks and a model with 
identified (transition) shock
Unemployment. In percentage o f labor 
force
Hungary
Regression 
with time 
dummies
Regression
with
transition
shock
Actual change in 
unemployment -3.5 -3.5
Predicted change by 
the model in 
unemployment. Of 
which:
-1.5 -2.1
Shock 1.9 3.8
Access to finance -3.4 -8.2
Government
interference -3.9 -4.9
Tax burden 3.8 7.2
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Table 3
Contribution o f investment climate institutions to service employment change 
over the last decade in the first wave o f EU transition countries
Hungary
(92-02)
Czech Rep. 
(92-02)
Slovakia
(94-02)
Poland
(94-02)
Latvia
(96-02)
Lithuania
(97-02)
Slovenia
(93-02)
, Average 
new EU 
Icountries
Actual change in 
service employment 1.11 3.78 0.66 1.33 1.89 -1.83 0.61 LOS
Predicted change by 
the model in service 
employment. Of 
which:
1.92 1.41 0.42 1.51 1.26 0.13 0.98 1.09
Time shock 1.42 1.33 1.08 1.08 0.44 0.10 1.33 0.97
Start-up costs -0.57 -0.15 -0.16 -0.26 0.17 0.03 0.02 -0.13
Access to finance 0.70 0.43 0.02 0.52 0.39 -0.02 1.03 0.44
Market regulation 1.00 0.24 -0.36 0.06 0.14 -0.01 -0.53 i 0.08
Tax burden -0.63 -0.44 -0.16 0.11 0.12 0.04 -0.87 -0.26
Only the significant variables from table 1 have been included in table 3
Table 4
Contribution o f investment climate institutions to service employment change 
over the last decade in the second wave o f EU transition countries
Romania
(94-02)
Bulgaria
(90-01)
Croatia
(96-02)
Average 
1 next 
' wave
Actual change in 
service employment -0.08 2.89 0.36 1.06
Predicted change by the 
model in service 
employment. Of which:
0.30 1.64 0.33 0.76
Time shock 1.08 0.92 0.44 0.81
Start-up costs 0.53 0.16 -0.01 0.23
Access to finance -1.75 0.34 -0.08 -0.50
Market regulation 0.06 0.05 0.34 0.15
Tax burden 0.37 0.16 -0.35 0.06
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Table 5
Contribution o f investment climate institutions to service employment change 
over the last decade in Russia and Ukraine
Ukrania
(90-02)
Russia
(90-02)
Average
Russia-
Ukraine
Predicted change by the 
model in service 
employment. Of which:
0.42 0.36 0.39
Time shock 0.81 0.81 0.81
Start-up costs -0.49 0.18 -0.16
Access to finance -0.19 -0.31 -0.25
Market regulation -0.06 -0.64 -0.35
Tax burden 0.36 0.31 0.34
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Appendix 1 
Country grouping
For benchmarking purposes we have grouped ECA countries in the following way:
CEE (CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE)
*First wave of EU transition economies 
**Second wave of EU transition countries 
Bulgaria**
Czech Republic*
Estonia*
Hungary*
Latvia*
Lithuania*
Poland*
Romania**
Slovakia*
Slovenia*
SEE (SOUTHERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE)
Albania
Bosnia i Herzegovina 
Croatia
Macedonia (FRY)
Serbia and Montenegro
CIS (COMMONWEALTH OF INDEPENDENT STATES)
* Central Asian republics 
Armenia 
Azerbaijan 
Belarus 
Georgia 
Kazakhstan*
Kyrgyz Republic*
Moldova
Russia
Tajikistan*
Turkmenistan*
Ukraine
Uzbekistan*
EUROPE
EU-15 +Norway, Switzerland and Luxemburg when available.
Appendix 2 
Investment Climate Indicators
Start-up cost index:
Data came from the World Bank database “Doing Businesses”. They are based on the 
work of Djankov, Simeon, Rafael La Porta, Florencio, Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer 
who measured the start-up costs of a new firm registered legally as a limited liability society 
and owned by residents in the country. Those costs include the number of procedures one has 
to undertake to register the business, the time the whole process takes, the minimum capital 
requirements and, finally, the monetary cost of the registration process. Both the costs of 
undertaking the process and minimum capital requirements are measured in percentage of 
GNI per capita.
To construct it we have followed the methodology used in the annual reports of the 
“Economic Freedom of the World” and the “Human Development Index” among others. 
The Human Development Index is developed by the United Nations Development Unit. Each 
component (procedures, time, cost and minimum capital) is re-scaled to be between 0 and 10; 
10 is assigned to the best country and 0 to the worst. Then an unweighted average is taken to 
calculate the overall indicator. There is data for Europe, the US and all EC A countries, with 
the exceptions of Estonia, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan.^^
Access to finance
The access to finance index is a summary of the following variables: ratio of domestic 
credit provided by deposit money to GDP (World development Indicators, World bank); 
interest rate spread and real interest rate (both from the Word Development Indicators, World 
Bank); ratio of deposit coverage to GDP, which is used by the IMF as a proxy to collateral^ "^ ; 
and the World Bank’s measure of creditors’ protection index. The World Bank’s Doing 
Business database reports an indicator of creditor rights in insolvency, based on the 
methodology of La Porta and others (1998). The indicator measures four powers of secured 
lenders in liquidation and reorganization, such as priority access to the proceeds from 
liquidation. The aggregate creditor rights index sums the total score across all four variables. 
A minimum score of 0 represents weak creditor rights and the maximum score of four 
represents strong creditor rights.
Each of those variables has been re-scaled so the best is assigned the number 10 and 
the worst 0. The overall indicator is a simple average of all components.
Exit costs
The World Bank’s database “Doing Businesses” is one of the first attempts to measure 
in a comparable way the exit costs. Members of the International Bar Association’s 
Committee on Insolvency and participating law firms or bankruptcy judges from around the 
world were sent a questionnaire enquiring about the number of procedures, time and cost of 
the process, as well as about the preservation of the priority rule to secured creditors and the 
efficiency of the outcome of the bankruptcy process. The index captures the summary
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James Gwartney, Robert Lawson and Neil Emerick: Economic Freedom of the World Annual reports. The 
Fraser Institute, Canada.
See appendix 1 for country grouping
Garcia, Gillian (1999): „Deposit insurance: a survey o f actual and best practices“ IMF WP/99/54
indicator '‘Goals o f insolvency index ” which measures whether the insolvency law achieves 
its goals successfully. The higher the index, the more successful is the system.
Market regulation
This is an unweighted average of the credit market and labor market regulation 
indexes provided by the Economic Freedom of the World’s Annual Report.^^ The credit 
market regulation captures issues such as the percentage of deposits held in privately owned 
banks, the degree of competition from foreign banks, the extension of credit to provate sector 
and the interest rate controls. The labor market regulation index comprises the impact of 
minimum wages, hiring and firing practices, union coverage and the effect of unemployment 
benefits on the incentives to work. Please keep in mind that the Economic Freedom of the 
World indexes are constructed from hard data and survey data (such as the Global 
competitiveness Report). Hence there is room for subjective interpretations.
Quality o f the legal system
This variable results from the multiplication of the World Bank’s objective 
information on the efficiency of the courts in enforcing contracts and the subjective evaluation 
of the 2003 Economic Freedom of the World of the independence from the government, 
impartiality and integrity of the judicial system.
The World Bank’s database “Doing Business” has information on issues related to 
enforcing contracts derived from questionnaires answered by attorneys at private law firms. 
The questionnaires cover the step-by-step evolution of a debt recovery case before local 
courts in the country’s most populous city. It covers issues such as the number of procedures 
required, duration and cost of process as well as an index of the procedural complexity of 
contract enforcement. We have summarized the four dimensions related to contract 
enforcement (procedures, duration, cost and complexity) in a unique index following the same 
methodology as before, that is, assigning a 10 to the best country, a 0 to the worst and then 
taking the average.
Size o f the government
The size of government is approximated by the output supplied by State-Operated- 
Enterprises and government investment as a percentage of GDP. The hard data come from the 
Economic Freedom of the World 2003 annual report.
Corruption Perception Index
The Corruption Perception Index is constructed by Transparency International. The 
data refers to 2002 and ranks the countries according to the degree in which corruption is 
perceived to exist among public officials and politicians. It draws on 15 different polls and 
surveys from nine independent institutions.
The tax burden
Tax revenue as percentage of GDP. It comes from the World Development Indicators 
of the World Bank.
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The following set of countries is excluded from the Economic Freedom Index: Kyrgyz Republic, Serbia and 
Montenegro, Bosnia, Macedonia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Moldova, Belarus, Azerbaijan, Georgia and Armenia
Appendix 3 
The regression model
As we stated before, Blanchard and Wolfers explain the evolution of unemployment 
along time and across countries by the different impact of shocks due to the specific 
institutional framework of countries. To capture the interaction between shocli and 
institutions, the simplest model is as follows:
« , = c , + 4 ( l  +  ^ r ,J T /)+ e , ,  (1)
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where u is the unemployment or employment rate in country i at time t, c are the country 
dummies, d  are time dummies, that is, unidentified shocks assumed to be equal across 
countries and X  is the time-invariant value over the period of the institution j  in country i. 
What matters in the estimation is not the value of the shock or the institution but the 
interaction between both of them. This is the most general specification since no specific 
shocks are imposed; we only assume that a number of shocks over time, of equal dimension 
across countries, have hit the economies. Hence, it allows isolating the impact of the 
(different) institutions from that of the shocks.
The next step in the analysis is to identify the shock, that is, to allow the shock to be 
specific to each country. We do that by substituting the time dummy in (1) by the transition 
shock, which differs across countries. Once we do that, we can estimate how the different 
institutional framework of each country has facilitated or obstructed the creation of a new 
private sector after the fall of the communism.
To estimate the coefficients corresponding to each of the institutions in model (1), we 
use an unbalanced panel of 28 ECA countries over 14 years: from 1988 to 2002. 
Unfortunately we have only one year of information for most of the institutions introduced in 
section 2. It is unfortunate because it would be interesting to explore how the reforms 
introduced in the business environment over the last decade have affected the capacity of the 
economy to respond to shocks. Given the data constraint, we have to assume that the 
institutional framework in which firms have operated over the period of analysis can be 
adequately summarized by the set of indexes introduced in section 2 .
The first period is left out so it becomes the constant. Therefore the country dummies can be interpreted as the 
unemployment in the first period.
